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In the early Roman State to be a Roman and to possess rights
were synonymous terms, and what is true of Rome was equally char-
acteristic of the ancient city state in general. The word civis, the
root from which are derived both "citizen" and "civilization," meant
a member of the city, and it was one's connection with the city that
gave him rights. He who was not a civis was in the early Roman law
regarded as destitute of legal rights.
"Citizens alone are entitled to the protection of the laws. An alien
is an outlaw, no less destitute of all legal rights and remedies than if
he were a slave. He can own no property, can make no contract,
nor any claim in a court of justice, can enter into no valid marriage,
nor have any lawful issue. He is an enemy of the Roman State and
at the mercy of any of its members. In practice he may enjoy some
measure of precarious security by placing himself under the protection
of some Roman citizen, who as his host and guardian, will see to it
that no harm befalls him, but in his own person and in his own right
he has no standing before the law."
2
At a later stage in the evolution of Rome, the peregrinus or foreigner,
'Based upon an address delivered at Seattle, Wash., before a joint meeting
of the Washington, Oregon, Idaho and British Columbia Bar Associations in
August, 1917. The germ of the idea here discussed is due to an address by
Professor A. V. Dicey at Cambridge University on February 26, 1897, on a
Proposal for the Common Citizenship of both Branches of the English People.
A brief summary of the address may be found in (1897) 64 NEw Yoaic NATION,
ig8. See also 8 John Adams, Works, 136; 3 John Quincy Adams, Memoirs,
513; Franklin, The Legislative History of Naturalization in the United States,
8-12.
'Salmond, Citizenship and Allegiance (igoI) 17 LAw QuART. REv. 276; Sohm,
Institutes of Roman Law (3d ed. translated by Ledlie) 173.
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if he was a member of a state bound to Rome by treaties of friendship,
received protection. The praetor peregrinus was established by the
side of the praetor urbanus to hear the complaints of such foreigners,
and to determine their causes according to the laws of their own states.
But such persons were not entitled to the privileges conferred by the
law of Rome; the jus civile was reserved for Roman citizens alone.
And even when with advancing civilization the system of distinct
personal .laws applying to citizens and aliens was supplemented by the
jus gentium, the principles of justice and fair dealing, the possession of
* the jus civile still remained synonymous with Roman citizenship. In 212
A. D. the Emperor Caracalla conferred Roman citizenship upon all
free members of political communities within the empire. The pos-
session of rights and the possession of citizenship were thus conferred
upon all free men within the civilized world. But in legal theory,
rights still depended upon citizenship as truly as in the earliest stages
of Rome's development, and the barbarian or the person deprived of
citizenship as a punishment for crime or otherwise had no rights except
so far as they were recognized under the jus gentium.3
It would be an interesting study to trace the evolution of the prin-
ciple of citizenship through the period that followed the fall of the
Roman Empire up to the present time. It is sufficient for the purpose
of this article to point out that feudalism brought a new principle into
the law of citizenship. The theory of a law which in its essence was
tribal gave way to the principle which determined one's legal status
by one's allegiance. 4
In the earlier stages of the development, as Maitland says, "the law
of feudal contract attempts for a while to swallow up all other law."
The law of the lord's court governed the vassal, save in so far as the
law of the universal church controlled him in some of his most impor-
tant relations. Even to the present day, the English law of citizenship
bears marks of its feudal origin; it knows no "citizens." The tech-
nical designation of persons born within the king's allegiance is
"British subjects." There was probably a time in the development
of feudalism when a man's descent and when the .place of his birth
'Sohm, Op. cit., 176; Leonhard, Institutionen des r3mischen Rechts, 188-i89.
Traces of its origin still are apparent in the law of citizenship of some of the
modem nations whose legal systems 'are based on the law of Rome. Thus,
Austria, Civil Code § 28: "The full enjoyment of civil rights is acquired by
virtue of citizenship"; France, Civil Code, Arts. 8 and 1i. Under the French
law, to enjoy political rights one must be a French citizen; to enjoy civil rights,
he must be French. Baudry-Lacantinerie, Pricis de droit civil (3d ed. 1914) 902
et seq. On the rights of aliens in France, see Professor Antoine Pillet's article,
Some Observations on the Private International Law of the Future (I917)
26 YALE LAW JOuRNAL, 631, 635-636.
'Salmond, Citizenship and Allegiance (igoi) 17 LAw QuART. REv. 27o; (19o2)
18 LAW QuART. REv. 49.
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were neither of them very significant, the essential question being, to
what lord did he owe homage? But by the end of the thirteenth
century-the time when the fundamental principles of the common
law of England had been outlined-the territorial element at the base
of the feudal system has triumphed, though feudalism itself has
decayed. Those born in England or in territory subject to the Eng-
lish king are subjects of the English king; those born elsewhere are
aliens, excepting those who were children of English subjects within
the king's allegiance. The law has thus shifted from the tribal basis
to the territorial.5 But though the foundations have changed, the
alien is still in a sense regarded as a person without rights, and
Littleton at the end of the fifteenth century tells us that he can bring
no action.8
The modern conception of citizenship, while it retains traces both
of the ancient personal theory and of the medieval feudal theory, has
undergone a profound change. In the United States and England,
for example, the possession of civil rights does not rest upon citizen-
ship as in Rome, or in the barbarian kingdoms founded upon the
wreck of Rome, nor does it rest upon allegiance as in the feudal state.
It is to-day in our legal system the rare exception when one's citizen-
ship or allegiance have anything to do with his civil rights. And the
exceptions are becoming rarer every day. Such aberrations as are
afforded by the alien land legislation of some of our states do not
diminish the force of the assertion that citizenship has little to do
with the possession of rights. A statute which forbids the acquisition
of land by one who is disqualified by federal laws from becoming a
citizen has plainly a very limited orbit. In general, it may be said
that the British and American theory is that the laws of a state bind
all who are within it whether citizens or aliens, and that they do not
in general bind its own citizens who are absent from the state.
Incapacities arising from alienage have for the most part been removed
either by statute or by treaty. Any person, whether citizen or alien,
resident or non-resident, is entitled to invoke the law for the protection
of his rights.7
Our federal Constitution well illustrates the diminished importance
which the American system attributes to citizenship and the increased
importance which it attributes to the individual. Nowhere in that
instrument as it was drafted and adopted in 1787 was there any defini-
i Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, 458-467.
Co. Litt. § 198.
"An alien, which is born out of the ligeance of our soveraigne lord the king, if
such alien will sue an action reall or personal, the tenant or defendant may say,
that he was borne in such a country, which is out of the king's allegeance, and
aske judgment if he shall be answered."
On the various statutes passed during the fifteenth century for the protection
of alien friends, see 2 Holdsworth, Hist. Eng. Law, 392-394.
'Beale, Treatise on Conflict of Laws (1916) §§ 55-57.
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tion of citizenship, though both citizenship in the United States and
in the states are referred to.8 It is significant that the first ten
amendments proposed in 1789 reiterate the importance of the indi-
vidual. Rights not granted are reserved to the "people," not to the
"citizens" of the states or of the United States; the rights of the
"people" to bear arms, to assemble for redress of grievances, to peti-
tion the government, to be secure from unreasonable searches, are
guaranteed.9 The Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 for the first time
puts a limitation upon the power of the states to deny citizenship to
persons born in the state, but it does not itself contain a complete
definition of citizenship. All persons born or naturalized in the United
States are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they
reside, but under the language of this amendment it would seem to
be competent for a state to consider other persons citizens. The most
important provisions of the amendment guarantee "persons" against
deprivation of life, liberty and property without due process of law,
and guarantee to "persons" within the jurisdiction of the states the
equal protection of the laws.10
American citizenship as such does not even confer ordinary political
rights as distinguished from civil rights. A citizen of the United
States by virtue merely of his citizenship has no more right to vote
than an alien. That right comes wholly from local law. Even the
selection of the franchise qualifications in the case of those voting for
presidential electors and members of Congress is left to the states.1 "
The only provisions of our federal laws and Constitution upon this
subject have to do with a state's forbidding a citizen of *the United
States to vote on account of race, color, or previous conditions of
servitude, and with the reduction in representation by reason of deny-
ing citizens the right to vote.12 The right to vote has been conferred
by many of the states upon persons not citizens of the United States. 3
8E. g. Art. III, sec. 2; Art. IV, sec. 2. Compare with the silence of our
Constitution on the definition of citizenship, Art. 3 of the Constitution of the
German Empire of 1871. Annuaire de ligislation itrangre, I87I, 236-237.
'Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, Arts. I, II, IV and V.
See the admirable article on The American Philosophy of Government and its
Effect on International Relations by Alpheus Henry Sno.w, 8 AM. Joun. INT.
LAw, 191-212, particularly at pages I93 et seq. Mr. Snow points out that the
American constitutional theory under which rights are not "granted" but only
"declared" by constitutions and laws, (Logan v. United States (1892) 144 U. S.
263, 293) has been transferred to the field of international relations.
The provision that "no State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" has been
less often invoked and has a less important effect than either of the other two
clauses of the second sentence of section i of the Fourteenth Amendment.
'Art. II, § i.
"Art. XIV, § 2, and Art. XV, § i, Amendments.
"Constitution of Delaware, Art. V, § 2; Massachusetts, Art. II, §§ i and 2,
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The civil rights incident to the condition of American citizenship
are equally tenuous. Aside from certain restrictions in the Revised
Statutes of the United States upon aliens acquiring claims under the
mining laws, and upon their ownership of American vessels, there is
scarcely any difference in the legal status under federal laws of citizens
and resident aliens.14 The former of the restrictions, that in respect
to ownership of mineral lands, is so construed by the courts as to
render it practically unimportant. No one but the government can
question the alien's right to the claim, and even the government can
not do so after he has made an assignment to a qualified person.15
And the ownership of shipping may be held by a corporation whose
stock is controlled by aliens. American citizenship, therefore, as dis-
tinguished from state citizenship, means very little indeed so far as
concerns the enjoyment of rights and privileges in time of peace.
State citizenship in one of the states of our Union is of even less
importance as an independent legal conception than citizenship in the
United States. Indeed, a condition that can be put on or off as easily
as a suit of clothes may be said to be characterized with too high
sounding an expression when it is called citizenship. A citizen of the
United States by merely changing his domicile from one state to
another is said to change his state citizenship."' If he changes it to a
foreign country, he loses his state citizenship, though he remains a
citizen of the United States.1 7 Truly, state citizenship is but another
phrase for domicile. The latter conception is one fraught with impor-
tant legal consequences, but it is wholly independent of citizenship.
In time of war, and generally with respect to military duties, citizen-
ship is a matter of great importance. The state demands military
service only from its citizens. But in determining questions of enemy
character and neutrality, the question of citizenship is by no means
controlling. An American citizen living in Germany is an alien enemy
so far as concerns his right to sue in an American court, or to make
contracts with Americans living in the United States. His goods are
subject to seizure as enemy prize upon the seas. Reprisals may be
made against his property. On the other hand, the German citizen
living in the United States is entitled to all the civil rights and privileges
and Art. III, Amendments; Michigan, Art. 7, § i; New Hampshire, Art. II,
§§ 12 and 27; New York, Art. II, § i; Pennsylvania, Art. VIII, § x and West
Virginia, Art. IV, § I; Stimson, Federal and State Constitutions (19O8) § 240;
x Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States (igio) pp. 272-273.
"U. S. Rev. Stat. §§ 2319 and 4131.
"Manuel V. Wulf (1894) 152 U. S. 505.
"See, e. g., Political Code of California, § 51.
"The citizens of the state are: i. All persons born in this state and residing
within it, except the children of transient aliens and of alien public ministers
and consuls; 2. All persons born out of this state who are citizens of the United
States and residing within this state."
" Picquet v. Swan (1831, C. C. ist) 5 Mason, 35.
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which belong to citizens, though in the interests of public safety he
may be subjected to certain restraints in regard to his power of free
locomotion. His property is not enemy property; his contracts are
legal; he may sue in our courts as freely as a citizen of the United
States.'8 Neutral character, too, is determined, not by allegiance or
citizenship, but by the fact of residence within the neutral state.'9
Sometimes language is strangely interpreted to conform with the
general principle that all within the state are subject to its laws. For
example, treason is defined by Section 5331 of the U. S. Revised
Statutes thus:
"Every person owing allegiance to the United States who levies war
against them, or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort
within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason."
The phrase "person owing allegiance" includes an alien of enemy
nationality living in the United States.20
If American citizenship is thus attenuated, British citizenship is
equally so. The alien may not own shipping registered under the
British flag ;21 he may not make a claim against the Crown ;22 he may
not sue in a consular court in a place where Great Britain has extra-
territorial privileges ;23 he may not be married under the Foreign Mar-
riage Act in an embassy at Paris or Rome.24  On the other hand, he is
free from some disadvantages which follow the British subject abroad.
He is not mentioned in the Treason Act of Henry VIII and presumably
Oppenheim, International Law (2d ed.) 110-112, 133-135; Porter v. Freuden-
berg [191] I K. B. 857. The National Conscription Act of May I8, 1917,
subjects to draft aliens, not of enemy character, who have declared their intention
to become citizens.
"It is inaccurate to speak of neutrality in connection with subjects, though
the word is sometimes so used, as in Art. 16 of Convention V of the Second Peace
Conference. The character, of course, is one belonging to states. But to
determine whether or not the subjects of a given state are to be treated as
the subjects of a neutral state, the test is as stated in the text. Thus, subjects
of neutral states living in Germany or even in the parts of Belgium occupied
by Germany bear a certain degree of enemy character. Oppenheim, 365; Mitsui
& Co. Ltd. v. Mumford [1915] 2 K. B. 27.
A full comment on The Right of Alien Enemies to Sue in Our Courts is to
be found in the November, 1917, issue of the YALE LAW JouRNAL, p. 1o4. The
various Trading with the Enemy Acts in England and the United States have
materially changed the common-law definition of enemy.
'Carlisle and Henderson's Case (1873, U. S.) 8 Ct Cl. 153; sub nom. Carlisle
v. U. S. 16 Wall. 147. So also in England: De lager v. Attorney General of
Natal [19o7] A. C. 326. See articles by Samuel MacClintock on Aliens under
the Federal Laws of the United States (19o9) 3 IlL. L. REv. 493 and 565;
4 Idem. 27 and 95. [See also Charles Warren, What is Giving Aid and Comfort
to the Enemy? p. 331, post.-Ed.]
Merchant Shipping Act (1894) 57 & 58 Vict. c. 6o, § I; 26 Halsbury, 16.
Salmond, Citizenship and Allegiance (19o2) 18 LAw QuART. Rnv. 49, 59-60.
(I89o) 53 & 54 Vict c. 37.
2' (1892) 55 & 56 Vict. c. 23.
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is not punishable where an act charged to be treason is committed
abroad ;2 he is not punishable in England for murder, manslaughter
or bigamy committed abroad ;26 he is not liable as are British subjects
for certain offenses under the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 and
under the Explosive Substances Act.2 7 So far as concerns the civil
and criminal law, the advantages and disadvantages of British citizen-
ship are about equal.
The jus honorum, the right to be elected and appointed to places of
honor, is reserved to British subjects. There was until 1915 some
doubt by reason of unfortunately phrased statutes whether one who
was not a natural born subject could hold the office of a Privy Coun-
cillor. But the cases of Rex v. Speyer and Rex v. Cassel solved the
doubt in favor of the right.28 In general, the mother country is by
no means jealous with regard to the political privileges attaching to
citizens. All political privileges are extended without discrimination
to persons born within the king's dominions and allegiance and to per-
sons naturalized in the United Kingdom or in any British possession
according to its laws.29 There is no office or honor to which a native
born Canadian or an alien naturalized according to the law of Canada
may not aspire, not only in the British Empire but in the government
of England itself. He may represent an English borough in Parlia-
ment, though he has never resided in England; he may be a member
of the Cabinet, a Lord Chancellor, a Prime Minister.
The conception connoted by the expression "British subject," even
more than that covered by American citizenship, fails to fit in with any
mechanical theory of sovereignty or of the State. Theoretically it
might be said, of course, that the Imperial Parliament, elected by the
voters of England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales might repeal the
British North America Act and put the government of Canada
entirely in the hands of the House of Commons and House of Lords
at Westminster or in any other body that it pleased. But such an
event is unthinkable. The material tie that has linked the colonies
to the mother country has been of the slenderest sort. The Canadian
or the New Zealander or the Australian has not even been bound to the
empire by the duties that are personified by the tax collector and the
drill sergeant. He has neither had to pay taxes nor to come to the
defense of the empire when her very life is threatened. And yet how
(1543) 35 Henry VIII, C. 2; Rex v. Casement [19,1] I K. B. 98, L. J. 467;
Report of Interdepartmental Committee on Naturalization. Parliamentary
Papers, i9OI, Cd. 723, reprinted in Report of American Citizenship Board, H. R.
Doc. 326, 59th Congress, 2d session.
(1861) 24 & 25 Vict. c. ioo, § 9.
Merchant Shipping Act, 57 & 58 Vict. c. 6o; Explosive Substances Act,
(883) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 3 § 3.
[i916] i K B. 595.
'British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act (I914) 4 & 5- Geo. V, c. 17.
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absurd is the language which Goldwin Smith used in I888, in view of
the events of the past three years 1
"What interests," said he, "of the class with which a federal parlia-
ment would deal have Australia and Canada in common? What enemy
has either of them when the other would be inclined to fight ?"30
The British Empire is a perpetual contradiction to the theory of
sovereignty on which our jurists and statesmen have been nourished.
An "empire" that does not command, "subjects" who are not bound
to obey,--small wonder that the Germans denied that there was any
reality corresponding to the phrases, British Empire and British sub-jects. And British nationality is just as hard to fit into the traditional
definition as is British citizenship. The languages, the religions, the
laws, the institutions of the various peoples making up the British
Empire are as various as the colors of their skins.31 Yet the British
Empire and British nationality are very real things.
The ease with which citizenship may nowadays be put on or off
both in the United States and in the British Empire is another indica-
tion of the weakening of the traditional relation between sovereign and
subject. No law, to be sure, has gone to the extent of the French
Revolutionary Constitution of 1793 which wholly abolished the oath
of allegiance and made citizens of all persons domiciled in France for
one year, who lived by labor.8 2 But our own naturalization law passed
at the first Congress in I79O, while it required the oath of allegiance,
required only two years as a basis for citizenship.33 In 1795 this
period of residence was extended to five years, because of the fear
that injury might result to republican institutions through the French
6migrs.3 4 Those who were residents of the United States when these
acts were passed were entitled to naturalization upon proof of two
years residence. During the ascendancy of the Federalist party in
1798, an act was passed requiring fourteen years residence as a con-
dition of naturalization, 5 but in I8o2 Congress restored the five-year
period, 86 which, in spite of the subsequent assaults of the Know-
Nothing and American parties has remained stationary ever since3 z
Liberality toward the naturalization of foreigners has always been
' MAcmIA 'S MAG. August, 1888. Cf. Frederick Scott Oliver, Alexander
Hamilton (1912) : "The British Empire is not a political fact, but only a phrase,
an influence or a sentiment."
"Pollard, Factors in Modern History, 14-17.
"Morse, Citizenship by Birth and Naturalization, 323.
C32 Laws of the U. S. from the 4th of March, 1789, to the 4th of March, 1815,
82-83; I U. S. Stats. at Large, io3.
" 2 Laws of the U. S. 466, I U. S. Stats. at Large, 414.
33 Laws of the U. S. 6I, I U. S. Stats. at Large, 566.
"e3 Laws of the U. S. 475, 2 U. S. Stats. at Large, 153.
'Franklin, The Legislative History of Naturalization in the United States, 184-
300.
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a prevailing American tradition. One of our grievances in the Dec-
laration of Independence was that the king
"has endeavoured to prevent the population of these States; for that
purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners."
In accordance with this liberal spirit, the Act of i79o introduced a
radical innovation in the procedure for naturalization by authorizing
any court of record to grant the privilege upon proof of the facts.
The English law at the time of our Revolution and until 1844 knew
only one avenue whereby an alien could be naturalized, namely, a
special act of Parliament. When one considers the difficulty and
expense of securing the passage of a private bill, this requirement made
naturalization practically prohibitive. Blackstone, in the edition of
his Commentaries published in 1788, thus states the law upon the
subject.38
"Naturalization cannot be performed but by act of parliament: for
by this an alien is put in exactly the same state as if he had been born
in the king's ligeance; except only that he is incapable, as well as a
denizen, of being a member of the privy council, or parliament, holding
offices, grants, etc. No bill for naturalization can be received in either
house of parliament, without such disabling clause in it: nor without
a clause disabling the person from obtaining any immunity in trade
thereby, in any foreign country, unless he shall have resided in Britain
for seven years next after the commencement of the session in which
he is naturalized. Neither can any person be naturalized or restored
in blood, unless he hath received the sacrament of the Lord's supper
within one month before the bringing in of the bill; and unless he
also takes the oaths of allegiance and supremacy in the presence of
the parliament. But these provisions have been usually dispensed
with by special acts of parliament, previous to bills of naturalization
of any foreign princes or princesses."
American ideas have completely conquered the mother country, and
it is hardly necessary to point out that the British law of naturalization
is to-day as liberal as our own.39 The state is no longer regarded as
a sort of guild which exists only for those who are so fortunate as to
have been born in a certain place or of parents possessing certain
privileges.
i Bi. Com. 374.
"The first general statute in England which permitted naturalization, by
certificate of the Secretary of State, was passed in 1844. (7 & 8 Vict. c. 66.)
The doctrine of "indissoluble allegiance" was abandoned in the Act of 187o.
(33 Vict. c. 4) ; the remaining trace of the doctrine of descent of citizenship
beyond the immediate children of British subjects was abandoned in 1914 by a
statute prepared before the war. (4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 17.) This last statute
permits each of the Dominions to confer British citizenship, if they choose to
do so. The act may be adopted or not by the Dominions and they may rescind
it whenever they please. This is the high-water mark of liberality in conferring
citizenship.
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Mr. Salmond thus sums up the situation:
"The acquisition and loss of citizenship are being gradually made
easier, while the legal effects of such acquisition and loss are gradually
being made less. The present state of things is indeed a compromise
between two fundamentally different ideas as to the constitution of a
political society.. Citizenship and its remaining privileges are the
outcome of the primitive conception of the state as a personal and
permanent union of determinate individuals, for whose exclusive
benefit the laws and government of the state exist. Residence,
regarded as a title of membership and protection, is the product of
the more modem conception of the state as consisting merely of the
inhabitants for the time being of a certain territory. The personal
idea is gradually giving place to the territorial."40
In passing it may be noticed that the contrast between the personal
and the territorial idea does not exhaust the matter. The laws under
our system exist as well for persons who have never been in the state
as for citizens or inhabitants. The state does not, in general, inquire
whether one claiming a right under its laws is or is not a resident any
more than it inquires whether he is a citizen. The question of resi-
dence or domicile does, indeed, become important in.questions of status
and succession. But as a general principle the idea of domicile itself
is, like that of citizenship, one of diminishing importance in the deter-
mination of rights. The territorial theory of law is gaining ground
both in England and America.
Equally significant with respect to the increased importance attrib-
uted to the individual and the modification of the idea of allegiance
have been the changes in the law regarding expatriation, especially in
the United States and in England. In I817, Jefferson in a letter to a
friend said:
"My opinion on the right of expatriation has been so long ago as
the year 1776 consigned to record in the Act of the Virginia Code
drawn by myself recognizing the right expressly and prescribing the
mode of exercising it. The evidence of this natural right like that
of the right to life, liberty and the use of our faculties, the pursuit of
happiness, is not left to the feeble and sophistical investigations of
the reason but is impressed on the sense of every man. We do not
claim these under the charters of Kings or legislators, but under the
King of Kings."4 1
Notwithstanding Jefferson's views and those of political thinkers of
the school to which he belonged, it was not until 1868 that Congress
wrote into our laws the following provision in language that recalls
Jefferson:
"Whereas the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right
of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life,
"Salmond, Jurisp. 195.
Ino Jefferson, Writings, 87.
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liberty and the pursuit of happiness; and whereas in the recognition
of this principle this Government has freely received emigrants from
all nations, and invested them with the rights of citizenship; and
whereas it is claimed that such American citizens, with their descend-
ants, are subjects of foreign states, owing allegiance to the Govern-
ment thereof; and whereas it is necessary to the maintenance of
public peace that this claim of foreign allegiance should be promptly
and finally disavowed: Therefore any declaration, instruction, opinion,
order, or decision of any officer of the United States which denies,
restricts, impairs, or questions the right of expatriation, is declared
inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Republic."
4 2
The status of a British subject under Section 13 of the British Nation-
ality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, provides that a British subject by
obtaining a certificate of naturalization or otherwise becoming natural-
ized in a foreign country ceases to be a British subject.43
The right of expatriation, and, indeed, the entire law of naturaliza-
tion, has been much extended by conventions entered into between the
United States and other powers. One of the first of these was that
negotiated through the offices of George Bancroft, Minister at Berlin,
with the North German Confederation in 1868. 4 This convention,
which is the model of subsequent treaties on the same subject, provides
for the reciprocal recognition of naturalization in either by the other
of the contracting powers. The ratification of the convention was
followed immediately by the Act of Congress of July 17, 1868, recog-
nizing the right of expatriation, and that act in turn was followed by
the adoption of the British act to the same effect in i87o.5 The
recommendations of the commission appointed to report to Congress
in 19o6 upon the subject of uaturalization, consisting of Messrs. James
Brown Scott, David Jayne Hill and Gaillard Hunt, were strongly in
favor of extending the number of these conventions. Comparatively
few new naturalization treaties have been negotiated since that date,
but the fact that since i868 a large number of such conventions have
been made has done much to increase the scope of the principle of
expatriation.46
The diminishing importance of the principle of descent in determin-
ing citizenship is another evidence of the loosening tie which the state
holds over the individual. In Roman law and in the. continental nations
of Europe, the question of citizenship has always been determined by
descent. The governing principle of nationality-under the French
4U. S. Rev. Stat., Sec. x999. Cf. (870) 33 Vict. c. 14.
a (1914) 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 17.
"2 Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, etc., between the U. S. and Other Powers
(IgIo) 1298.
Supra, n. 42.
See Report of American Citizenship Board (igo6) H. R. Doc. 326, 59th
Congress, 2d Session; Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad
(1915) 544-552, 674-687.
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law, for example-is the ius sanguinis. A child of American parents,
born in Paris, was until 1889 not French, nor were his grandchildren
or his descendants to the remotest generation French, so long as they
remained unnaturalized; e converso the descendants of French people
living in foreign countries retained and still retain their French nation-
ality.47  On the other hand, the English law from which our law of
citizenship is derived determines citizenship by the place of birth. The
child of Chinese parentage, born in a British colony or in the United
States, is a British or American citizen, even though he belongs to a
race excluded from the benefit of the naturalization laws.48 It is very
plain that the English and the American rule which determines citi-
zenship by the principle of place of birth, the jus soli, rather than by
that of descent, the jus sanguinis, -operates in favor of diminishing the
importance of the idea that citizenship is an unchangeable status, and
makes for mobility in respect to the individual. English law from
1350 to 1914, however, retained so much of the principle of jus
sanguinis as to recognize, in the case of persons of English or British
blood born abroad, their British nationality to the third generation.
The United States at the beginning of her legislation abandoned the
English rule, and confines the privileges of American citizenship to
children of Americans born abroad; the right of citizenship has never
descended to the grandchildren of American citizens who may happen
to be born abroad, unless their parents have resided in the United
States. In 1914 the British Parliament adopted the American view
and abandoned the principle of English law maintained for more than
five centuries which permitted grandchildren of English subjects born
abroad to retain their British citizenship.49 The Latin-American
countries, too, though their legal systems are based upon the civil
law, indicate a very distinct tendency toward the adoption of the doc-
trine of ius soli, or at least toward a minimization of the principle of
jus sanguinis. The Constitution of Brazil, for example, permits chil-
dren of Brazilian parents born abroad to claim Brazilian citizenship,
provided they become domiciled in Brazil. It recognizes the principle
of jus sanguinis, therefore, to a much less degree than France or
Italy, which do not mention domicile. It is said that at least fourteen
states of Latin America claim as nationals all born within their
territory.
While it must be conceded that the law of continental Europe still
clings to the principle of descent or blood as the test of citizenship,
it is also true that some inroads have been made upon that principle
'Baudry-Lacantinerie, Pricis de droit civil (1914) 92-918; (1915) 9 Am.
Joua. INwr. LAw, 942.
41 U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark (1898) 169 U. S. 649.
"This recommendation was made by the Interdepartmental Committee on the
subject of naturalization in its Report to Parliament of July 24, Igoi. See H. R.
Doc. 326, 59th Cong., 2d Sess., at p. 346, where this report is reprinted.
A BASIS FOR WORLD PEACE
in favor of the doctrine of jus soli. France, until 1889, held that a
person born on French soil of foreign parents followed the nationality
of his parents, but in that year a law was passed whereby such person,
if he remains domiciled in France until majority, is French, unless he
disclaims French nationality within the year following his reaching
majority. He cannot disclaim, however, if he has not performed
military service as required by the country of his parent's nationality.
Since 1893, every person born in France, one of whose parents is
French, is also French, subject to the right to disclaim as provided in
the law of 1889. The provisions of the law of 1889 may be modified
by treaty. The French Civil Code permits expatriation, but insists on
the consent of the French government where the party seeking natural-
ization abroad is liable to military duties. France, however, still insists
that children and grandchildren of French parents born abroad remain
French. 10
Italy, whose jurists and legislators are deeply impregnated with
theories of nationality, has, like France, adopted in a modified form
the principle of jus soli, in her more recent legislation. Article III
of the Law of June 13, 1912, accords to persons born in Italy the
privileges of Italian citizenship, somewhat as under the French law
of i889. Conversely it is provided by Article VII of this law-and
in this respect Italy has gone beyond France-that persons of Italian
parentage born and residing abroad, may, at majority, renounce their
Italian nationality, if their place of birth claims them as citizens.
Treaties may modify these provisions. The Italian law also recog-
nizes expatriation under Article VIII, but the acquisition of a new
nationality does not absolve the person acquiring it from his Italian
military obligations. In presenting this legislation the government
declared its purpose to avoid conflicts between the various laws of
nationality, giving rise to perplexing questions of "dual nationality."
The government desired to make the law of nationality conform
"with the actual exigencies of social life, in particular those which
result from the great currents of emigration and from the facility with
which citizens of divers nationalities are detached from their countries
of birth."
The law as passed indicates a broader spirit of comity and a greater
willingness to leave to the individual choice with reference to the
selection of his nationality than has been the case in former Italian
legislation on this subject. The modification of the principle of indis-
soluble allegiance in a country whose legal thinkers have stood in the
front rank as champions of the principle of nationality, is significant
of the changing conception of the relation of the individual to the
state.51
Civil Code, Art. 8, § 5, added by the Law of June 26, 1889.
On "dual citizenship" see 3 Moore, Digest of International Law (i9o6)
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Of the great western nations, Germany alone has during the last
half-century tended to show in her legislation upon citizenship a retro-
gressive tendency. The law of the German Empire of 1871 in respect
to nationality, which was adopted from the North German Confedera-
tion, was indeed framed on liberal lines. It expressly declared, for
example, that adoption cannot affect the nationality of the person
adopted; it recognized the right of expatriation by a provision that a
citizen lost his natiofiality by ten years residence abroad, and it
authorized this period to be reduced to five years by treaties with for-
eign countries.5 2 But in January, 1914, six months before the war, a
new nationality law was adopted for the empire. The spirit of this
law indicates something of a return to the tribal theory of citizenship.
Loss of German citizenship no longer follows upon absence in a foreign
country as was the case under the law of 1871, nor is there any pro-
vision for naturalization treaties. Some of the provisions of the new
law show an extreme disregard for the legislation and internal policy
of other countries. Thus, a former German or a descendant of a
former German may secure naturalization in Germany without ever
living there or leaving the country of which he is a citizen, and this
rule even applies to the adopted children of Germans. As Germany,
like France, adopts the principle of jus sanguinis, this can only mean
that the children, natural or adoptive, the grandchildren and descend-
ants to the remotest generation of those who were once German but
have ceased to be such by naturalization or other act, can, without
leaving the country to which they owe allegiance, even if it is the
country of their birth and parentage, become citizens of the German
Empire. 3 No modern state before this law had permitted naturaliza-
tion to persons who have never been in the country, though the French
National Assembly did by special act confer French citizenship upon
some distinguished individuals, among others, Jeremy Bentham,
Thomas Paine and George Washington. The conferring of citizen-
ship in such a way, however, could hardly be said to interfere with the
internal policy of other states as does the German Act of 1914. The
518 et seq., and Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (ig5)
58o et seq. On the French la.w, see Baudry-Lacantinerie, Pricis de droit cihil
(3d ed. 1914) 9o2 et seq. For the Italian law of 1912, see Annuaire de ligislation
itrangare (1912) 147. The law of the Latin-American states is discussed by
Harmodis Arias, Nationality and Naturalisation in Latin America from the Point
of View of International Law (gio) ii JouR. Soc. ComP. LEG. (N. S.) 126.
The English law of 1914 may be found in (ii5) 9 Am. Jout. INT. LAW, Supp.
413, and an article on the same by Richard W. Flournoy, Jr., The New British
Imperial Law of Nationality, 9 Ibid. 870.
u'Annuaire de ligislation 6trangare (1871) 183, contains a French translation
of the text of the Reichsgesetz of June i, 187o.
' The full text of the law in English translation may be found in (1914) 8 Am.
JouR. INT. LAW, Supp. 217-227. It is commented upon in the same Journal, vol.
8, 477 by Richard W. Flournoy, Jr., and also in vol. 9, 939.
A BASIS FOR WORLD PEACE 33
twenty-fifth section of the new Nationality Act contains this remarkable
provision:
"Citizenship is not lost by one who, before acquiring foreign citizen-
ship, has secured upon application the written consent of the competent
authorities of his home state to retain his citizenship."
While elsewhere the claims of blood descent have been weakening,
Germany proclaims that those of German blood may demand German
citizenship, though there be no territorial relation between them and
the state. It might be noted that a German seeking naturalization in
the United States and attempting to take advantage of section 25 of
the German Act would have to commit perjury, for he must by our laws
forswear his former allegiance. 4
"The Emperor of Germany in opening the Reichstag on February 7, 1912,
stated the object of the law to be to preserve to Germans residing abroad their
nationality to the farthest degree possible and to permit them to recover it
when they have lost it. Annuaire de ligislation itrang~re (1912) 29: "I a
annonc6 le depbt d'un projet de loi ayant pour objet de conserver le plus possible
leur nationaliti aux Allemands risidant 4 l'tranger et de leur permettre de la
recouvrer quand ils l'ont perdue; c'est encore un moyen de fortifier l'influence
germanique hors des frontilres!'
Professor Borchard has kindly called the writer's attention to the fact that
the clause of the German law permitting the retention of German citizenship
was designed, as the committee reports of the Reichstag show, to preserve
German citizenship for such Germans as become nationals of other countries
without their demanding such new nationality, as is the case where one marries
a Brazilian woman, or for merely economic reasons, as to enable them to practice
certain professions or to own real estate in certain South American countries.
The language of the statute, of which the writer unfortunately has been able
only to procure the English and French translations, is certainly sufficiently
broad to justify the statement made in the text. The law is certainly not worded
with the precision which we might expect from a German statute, if its purpose
was only as stated in the Reichstag's committee report. That the Bancroft trea-
ties would probably prevent the application of the law to the United States is
immaterial, for the reference was only used for the general purpose of illustrat-
ing the fact that the new German law indicates a narrow conception of the
principle of nationality, and a disregard of the internal policy of other states.
Professor Borchard also suggests that a German applying for naturalization
in the United States would no more be guilty of perjury than a Frenchman for-
swearing allegiance to France. The Frenchman, however, may well be honest
when he forswears allegiance, though his native law refuses to give his act
legal effect. He certainly means to forswear allegiance, and hopes that the
United States will support his claim of citizenship even as against France. The
German, on the other hand, who has expressly claimed his German citizenship
in writing can hardly speak the truth when he takes an oath to the effect that
he forswears allegiance to the fatherland. The view of the clause stated in the
text is also taken by the writer of a comment on the German Nationality Act,
9 Am. JoUm. INT. LAW, 941.
[An exhaustive article on the question of dual allegiance in relation to the
German Nationality Act of 1913, by Theodore H. Thiesing of the Legislative
Reference Division of the Library of Congress, will be published in an early
number of the YAIt LAW J ORNAL.-Ed.]
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The illustrations in this article pointing out the altered views con-
cerning membership in the state in the great liberal nations of the
world, must have suggested the idea that it would not be very revolu-
tionary to extend the analogy of interstate citizenship which now exists
among the states of our Union to an international citizenship among
the states of the world. A citizenship in a world state would thus be
created, not so very unlike that now existing in the British Empire.
Indeed, that situation in practice almost exists to-day. Treaties of the
United States confer upon the citizens of other countries most of the
privileges, other than political, which are possessed by our own citizens.
A rather recent treaty with Italy even goes so far as to grant to
Italian subjects, whether resident or non-resident, the benefit of local
'statutes for wrongful death, for the purpose apparently of nullifying
an unfortunate line of court decisions.0 5 The most favored nation
clause may, in some cases, extend privileges granted to the subjects, of
one country to other countries. No very radical change would be
effected in the civil rights of aliens if what is done indirectly by special
treaties were done directly by ordinary legislation. Suppose, for
example, that the United States should confer American citizenship
upon all British subjects, and that the Imperial Parliament should
confer British citizenship upon all Americans. The civil rights of
citizens of the United States in England or Canada would scarcely
be changed, nor would those of British citizens living in the United
States. The most important single change with respect to civil rights
would be that each might own interests in the other's shipping, cer-
tainly not a very fundamental matter in these days of corporation and
international finance.
But, it may be said, inter-citizenship would frightfully upset our
political system. An Englishman or a Canadian under such a system
might vote to hold office even though he was not permanently attached
to our country. It is to be remembered, however, that the right to
vote and hold office is not universal among our own citizens. Local
statutes protect the franchise by varying requirements with reference
to length of residence, educational standards, etc. Moreover, the
holding of office is dependent upon the power of getting it, and there
would be little likelihood of a stranger being elected or appointed to
important office. As English law now exists, any British citizen, no
matter where he lives, may represent an English borough in Parlia-
ment, but the instances where Australians or Canadians have availed
themselves of the privilege are rare. It is by no means certain that
it would not be desirable to have an occasional foreign representative
in our halls of legislation.
With respect to international relations, the innovation would have
W3 Charles, Treaties, etc., between the U. S. and Other Powers, 442. (Feb.
25, 1913.)
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more important consequences. Indeed, the main purpose of the alter-
ation in the law would be for its effect upon those relations. The
duty of military service should doubtless be limited to those who were
actually within the territory of the country demanding the services,
and, perhaps, an Englishman born should not be required by the law
of the United States to fight against the country of his birth. In
dealing with other nations, the sovereignty of each of the states grant-
ing common citizenship would be undisturbed. Thus, the United
States would be under no greater legal obligation to aid in redressing
the violation of Belgium's neutrality than it was in August, 1914, even
though its citizens were also British or French citizens. Perhaps, if
a common citizenship had existed, we would have entered the war in
1914, rather than in 1917, just as Australia and Canada entered it.
But this would not have been because of any legal compulsion, but
because of the consciousness of close relations with those who shared
citizenship with us. Indeed, if a common citizenship had existed
between subjects of the British Empire and citizens of the United
States, it may well be doubted whether the attack upon Belgium would
have been made. Such a power as that represented by the United
States joined with that of the British Empire would be one that could
not lightly be defied. The world war has demonstrated how effective
such a nondescript political device as British citizenship can be even
in terms of military power. The lesson will not soon be lost.
It may be urged by Americans against the notion of common citizen-
ship that it would involve us in the intrigues of European diplomacy.
But the United States has never been a party to secret treaties, and her
influence will weigh to lessen the possibility of such arrangements in
the reconstructed world. While secret diplomacy is more or less of a
myth, since the mutual rights and duties of the parties to secret alli-
ances are usually as well known to the public men of those nations
against whom the alliances are directed as to those of the contracting
parties, democracy demands that the forms of secrecy be abandoned,
and that the agents of the people should not be permitted to withhold
from the principal their private knowledge. The diplomacy of the
present is suitable only to dynastic states, and it should disappear with
the dynastic form of government. The force of a public opinion
based upon a wider principle of citizenship would have a powerful
tendency towards placing the diplomacy of the world on a surer basis.
Statesmen, conscious that they are dealing with units bound together
by moral ties only, will be obliged to defer to a wider public opinion
than has been the case in the past.5
6
Hobhouse, Morals in Evolution, 64:
"Every human being, in proportion as he is normally developed, is able to enter
into and contribute to the good life so conceived, and that he should do so is
the sum and substance of all his duties to society and all the duties of society
to him. But this same principle once pushed through, annuls, ethically speaking,
23
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The plan proposed is not designed to undermine the idea of nation-
ality or to interfere with the virtue of patriotism. Indeed, that virtue
is by no means dependent upon the existence of an autonomous state.
The Scotcbmah has never been blamed for a defect of patriotism nor
of a keen sense of nationality, nor does the loyalty of the Californian
to his native or adopted state interfere in the slightest degree with his
loyalty to the United States. On the contrary, the spirit of loyalty
has been intensified rather than diminished by the dual spiritual
allegiance. Even if it be conceded that the consciousness of citizen-
ship in other national units would at first produce but a faint glow in
the heart of the American citizen, it is nevertheless one that might be
warmed to flame. He might come in time to think in terms of humanity
rather than of nationality, to prize the possession of common ideals
and aspirations rather than the accident of place of birth or descent,
to regard himself as a citizen of a world state rather than the fortunate
inheritor of a special and superior civilization.
President Wilson in an address delivered on September 8, 1916,
before the National American Suffrage Association pointed out that
the older theories of government were fundamentally based upon the
mechanistic idea of the universe to which Newton gave voice. We
know that in our own country the attempt to control the development
of our life by mechanistic formulas has failed. In the wider field of
international relations, it is doubtful whether a league to enforce peace
based upon the principle of written compacts and formal understand-
ings is capable of solving the problem of world peace. If there is to be
an effective league to enforce peace, it must rest upon an international
public opinion. One of the best bases for such a public opinion is the
conception of inter-citizenship between the citizens of the great
powers.
the distinction between citizen and foreigner, for the foreigner may be quiteequally capable of the same life, and, if so is morally seized of the same rightsand duties, and if, through difference of race, he is not always equally capable,still his rights and duties cannot fall. to zero, but vary only with the degree ofhis incapacity. Hence the fully developed state in which the principle ofpersonality is vigorously carried through, must also find itself in definite ethical
relation to humanity as a whole."
